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When the first Ladakh Hill Development Council 
(Leh) was sworn in on 3 September 1995, Le.h District 
in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir regained a 
measure of the autonomy that the Kingdom of Ladakh 
had lost in the 1830s .1 The Ladakh Autonomous Hill 
Development Councils Act 1995 , decreed by the 
Pres ident a few months earlier, signified a major 
concess ion on the part of State and Central 
Government, especially considering the strategic and 
political importance of Ladakh in the overall Kashmir 
issue.2The 'Reasons for Enactment' accompanying the 
Act sugges t a straightforward justification: a remote 
mountain region in need and desirous of decentralization 
of decision making is g iven its own administrative 
body. At first glance, then, this is the stuff that many 
indigenous peoples, many marginal groups in India and 
around the world, dream about: a responsive government 
recognizes the legitimate desires of a minority with a 
distinct identity. 
The Indian press hailed the institution of the Ladakh 
Autonomous Hill Development Council, Leh 
(LAHDeC), with headlines such as "A New 
Beginning"3 (Bagla , 1995); the Prime Minister, P.V . 
Narasimha Rao, sent his congratulations to "the brave 
people of Leh" and expressed his conviction that "this 
would give tremendous boost to the developmental 
activi ties in Leh and meet the aspirations of the people 
of the region for all round progress "4; the Home 
1 Conquered by the Dogra state a few years earlier, 
Ladakh was an integral part of the State of Jammu and 
Kashmir that was created through the Treaty of Amr.itsar 
of 1842. While few Ladakhis would challenge the 
reg ion 's association with India, the link with Kashni.ir 
has remained contentious. 
2 See (India, 1995) for the full text of the Act. This text 
is also available online at the website of The Mountain 
Forum (http://www .mtnforum.org). 
3 Pallava Bag Ia (1995) in Frontline. 
4 P.V. Narasimha Rao, telegram toP. Namgyal, 3 
September 1995. 
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Minster joined in and the Governor of the State, General 
K.V. Krishna Rao, addressed the first meeting of the 
Council saying: 
"Today, we have gathered here to mark one of the 
most important turning points in the history of this 
great land . This historic event also signifies that from 
now on, the people of this land will preside over their 
own destiny . ( ... ) It has been a longstanding demand of 
the people here for the right to take decisions for their 
own development. You had to undergo considerable 
struggle in achieving this Hill Council. I am happy to 
note that your struggle has been peaceful and democratic 
means were used towards this end. This is a shining 
example for every one in our great democratic country, 
that one can achieve one's legitimate demands through 
constitutional means."5 
As the Governor's words suggest, Leh District did 
not get its Hill Council without a struggle. Indeed, if 
we trace the history of the demand for regional 
autonomy, we need to go back at least to the 1930s.6 In 
his speech , the Governor recognizes the length and 
difficulty of the struggle and praises the Ladakhis for 
having used peaceful, democratic means . Now that all is 
settled, one can get on with the business of 
development. 
The Governor's speech, the journalists' writings and 
the justification accompanying the Act offer an insight 
5 Excerpt from "Address by General K.V. Krishna Rao, 
PVSM (Retd), His Excellency the Governor of Jammu 
and Kashmir to Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development 
Council, Leh, on 3rd September, 1995." 
6 Of course, Ladakhis also offered resistance to their 
incorporation into the State in the first place in the 
1830s and after, and the memory of independent Ladakh, 
as we shall see, remains relevant today. However, in 
terms of the modern political formulation of the demand 
for regional autonomy, the 1930s and 1940s are where a 
new form of representation and justification of the 
demand can be seen to emerge for the first time. 
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into the creation of an official history. This simplified, 
sanitized representation of the struggle for regiona l 
autonomy and its outcome may enter textbooks and 
public memory, escaping the confines of the audiences 
and purposes for which it is originally being composed: 
to ju s tify c on cess ion s to a s mall bun c h of 
tro ublemakers on the frontiers of the Nation through 
safel y reinterpreting and representing both history and 
solutions to the conflict as firmly within th e 
constitutional, political, and nationalist bounds of the 
nation-state. Ladakhis had leg itimate grievances and 
they were recognized and addressed by the state . 
The Government's willingness to accommodate the 
Ladakhi demand must also be seen in the light of the 
broader domestic and international politics of the 
Kashmir issue, but one still needs to ask why the state 
celebrates the strengthening of regionalist forces in this 
case. This should at the very least lead us to ask 
whether the granting of autonomy to Ladakh is in fact 
an illustration of the possibility of successful resistance 
to the hegemony of the nation-state and national 
development project. The following analysis suggests 
that quite the reverse may be true: it is precisely its firm 
location within the discursive and institutional frames 
of nation-state and development project that makes the 
empowerment of the Hill Council desirable from the 
perspective of the state (and arguably from the 
perspective of at least some of the Ladakhi leaders of the 
agitation). It is clear that - considering how Ladakhi 
representatives justified their claims in terms of 
backwardness and patriotism-the demand did not pose a 
threat to the national project and nationalist ideology of 
the Union. This call for minority rights, in other words, 
was anything but counter-hegemonic, and locally, 
within Ladakh, was premised on the radical and at times 
violent silencing of anOther Ladakhi community: 
Muslims.? 
Here, I will look at how political leaders in Ladakh 
have presented and justified their demand for regional 
autonomy over the years. I will show that these 
representations relied on a complementary, but 
apparently contradictory claim: that Ladakhis are 
different from the rest of the Indian nation, but true 
patriots nevertheless. The possibility of making this 
claim in turn is premised on, first, an erasure and 
silencing of difference within Ladakh (of class , gender, 
religion, etc.). This was achieved by emphasizing the 
region's geographical, cultural and socio-economic 
7 Muslims constitute close to 50% of the population of 
Ladakh as a whol e . The vast majority of Muslims live 
in Kargil d istrict and are Shias . In Leh town , there is a 
s izable minority of Sunni Muslims, commonly referred 
to as ;\ r Pon. From most official and popular 
descriptions of Ladakh, its population and culture , the 
presence of Muslims is either ignored or made into a 
recent, essentially foreign deve lopment. For d iscussions 
of the Muslims in Ladakh, see e .g . (Dollfus , 1991; 
Dollfus, 1995; Grist, 1993; G rist , 1995 ; Rizvi , 1986) . 
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uniqueness within Indi a, and later, during the 1989 
agitation, re inforced thro ugh the use of a communal 
represe ntat ion of Ladakh as Buddh ist. Th is second 
move , of course, was important in enabli ng the Ladakhi 
Buddhi st leadersh ip to contrast themse lves with the 
O ther comm unit ies in the wider State, above all 
M us li ms . Ladakhi secessioni sm, it was made 
abundantl y clear, was a imed aga inst the State of Jammu 
and Kas hmi r , not the Union. 
I will suggest th at we need to unders tand Ladakhi 
politics, like politics e lsewhere , as a complex process 
of negotiation , contestat ion , and represe ntation; a 
'game' of strategic deployment of justifications , at once 
making use of and con strained by the spaces made 
available by the state 's own di scurs ive tropes. Ladakhi 
politics, in other words, is the work of people whose 
actions are guided by th eir reading and interpretation of 
the wide r politica l fi e ld , and the ir readin gs and 
interpretations , the ir action s, in turn help shape and 
reconstitute that very same fi e ld . Formal politics is, in 
this sense, a question of per formance, although not just 
performance. 
Three central the mes em erge from Ladakhi 
representations: Ladakh is a poor and backward region , 
and home to a unique , distinct culture and people ; 
Kashmir ' s Government has neg lected Ladakh and has 
fail ed to develop the reg ion; Ladakh 's population are 
true patriots and dedicated to the Nation. The same 
themes are found also in the more communal 
representations, where Ladakhiness is reduced to 
Buddhism; the Kas hmir Government is driven by 
communal motivations; and the secessionists in the 
Valley cannot be trusted precisely because they are 
Muslims, while Ladakh's Buddhists are naturally part of 
India . 
As the followin g account will show, these themes, 
both in their communal and all-Ladakh forms , recur 
from the time of the first representation presented on 
behalf of the Buddhist community to the Glancy 
Commission.8 More often than not, an all-Ladakh form 
is chosen, with the notable exception of Partition, and 
the 1969 and 1989 agitations. The first of these can be 
understood in the context of uncertainty over Kashmir' s 
future and the recent invas ion of Ladakh by Pakistani 
'raiders .' The second and third are of a quite different 
nature . In both Ladakhi politicians consciously used a 
communal frame to put pressure on the State and 
Centre . After the success , albe it limited , of the 1969 
agitation, the benefits of communal strateg ies were clear 
to the younger Ladak h B uddhi st Assoc iation (LB A) 
leaders . The 1989 agitat ion , which led to the formation 
of the Hill Council in 1995, is unique in the consistent 
effort made by Ladakhi act ivists to control both internal 
8 Under pressure from growing opposition against his 
rule, Maharaja Hari S ingh appointed a Commission of 
Inquiry "to look into grievances and compla ints," that 
became known by the name of its British chairman . 
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and external representations and mobilizations, allowing 
the effective positioning of the LBA as communalists 
agai nst their will , rather than by choice. This enabled 
them to champion the secular and developmen talist 
ideals of the Ind ian state, while pursuing a relentlessly 
communal campaign 'at home.' 
Pre-Independence Demands 
The Buddhist community of Ladakh was probably 
first formally represented on November 13, 1931, in 
Srinagar. On this occasion B.J. Glancy Esq, I.C.S., 
C.S.I ., etc, Special Minister, His Highness' 
Government, Jammu and Kashmir, asked a delegation 
'representing' the Buddhists of Kashmir to submit a 
"Memorandum ." 
At this particular moment in subcontinental history, 
'communalism' was seen and experienced as the most 
important problem, the organizing principle of Indian 
society, and certainly as the basis for political 
organization. Kashmir may have been lagging behind 
other parts of the Subcontinent in communalization, 
but has done a lot of catching up. That is after all why 
the Glancy Commission is there in the first place. Its 
task is explicitly to enquire into the grievances of 
communities. Ladakh being a very marginal area, 'the' 
Buddhists did not have any formal representation on the 
commission, while Hindus and Muslims of Kashmir 
and Jammu had a representative each, respectively.9 The 
representation sought from the Buddhist Community 
made sense within the frame of perception, analysis, and 
operation of the Commission, and indeed of the 
submitters, who went on to found the Kashmir Raj 
Bodhi Maha Sabha. The 1935 Triennial Report of the 
KRBMS states: "Those (1932) were the days of 
political upheaval in the Kashmir State. The Sabha, 
therefore, had to devote its attention and energy to the 
cause of the forty thousand helpless and downtrodden 
Buddhists of Ladakh whose case in the general scramble 
for percentages, would, otherwise have gone by default." 
(KRBMS, 1935) 
In the memorandum, several important themes can 
be distinguished. First, the idea of 'community' and 
hence the possibility and desirability of 'representation' 
is central. For the KRBMS leadership, having 
experience and knowledge of the communal organisation 
of Indian politics and the changing nature of state 
involvement in allocations on a communal basis, to 
represent and be seen to represent community is the 
only way forward to the 'modern' civilized life. 
Secondly, Progress , upliftment, etc ., are very much 
central concerns of the Sabha. Education, in their eyes, 
is the key to civilization, survival, and progress. And 
such things are ach ieved on a community basis.Their 
communal understanding of progress and history is also 
9 I t was because of the desire for a Buddhist voice at the 
Enquiry that the KRBMS was founded . (See also 
Rabgias, 1984; Shakspo, 1988). 
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seen in the reference to "amelioration" of the life of the 
Ladakhi Buddhists, and in the goal being "equality" with 
"the other communities inhabiting the State." 
Community, in the KRBMS world view, is already 
objectified · in a way which is quite unthinkable in 
Ladakh itself at this point. I 0 
Economic disadvantages were and continued to be 
only a secondary concern of the KRBMS, as these were 
seen to be caused precisely by the Ladakhi Buddhists' 
educational 'backwardness.' Statistics were deployed to 
strengthen the case for Buddhist discrimination, 
legitimacy of demands, and need for appropriate action 
by the Government. II The use of number here is also 
an instrument to compare directly and competitively the 
'status' and 'privileging' of the different 
communities .12 
A final theme to be mentioned here is the implicit 
or explicit threat of violence. In the 1935 Report, which 
was written for an international and national audience of 
Buddhist Sabhas, this is stated as follows: 
"Smarting under the sting of this grave injustice (the 
lack of action by the Government) the Sabha was in 
danger of drifting towards jingoist tactics- the favourite 
weapon of other communties in those and later times 
and giving loose rein to its deep resentment through 
press and platform and in other ways . But the Sabha 
refused to be carried Dff its feet and tenaciously held to 
its creed of peaceful and constitutional representation." 
(KRBMS, 1935: 4)--- . 
10 The central figure in the formulation of the views of 
the KRBMS as well as in 'educating' Ladakhis in these 
terms was Shridhar Kaul. Kaul was one of the founders 
of the KRBMS, and as a civil servant of the J&K State 
held a number of different education-related posts, 
including that of 'inspector of schools.' Kaul was 
mentor to many of Ladakh's reform-oriented political 
and social activists, served as Kushok Bakula 
Rinpoches's adviser and speech writer, and was one of 
the central figures in promoting modern education in 
Ladakh. Some consider him also to be the original 
source of communalism in Ladakh. 
11 As is evident from KRBMS 1935, there were several 
representations made to the Commission in 1931-2. 
Several issues mentioned in the 1935 discussion are not 
to be found in the Mahabodhi reptint of the text of the 
December 1931 memorandum. Missing from it, for 
example, are issues such as consumption of chang, 
Personal Law, inheritance, etc. Almost certainly these 
issues were raised in other memoranda which I have 
been unable to locate . (See Representatives of Kashmir 
Buddhists, 1932). Bertelsen 1997 has a fuller account of 
the various memoranda. 
12 As we will see, there is a remarkable continuity in 
the way number and statistics are used to present and 
legitimize the 'Buddhist' case, but there are also 
important differences between 1932 and 1989. 
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The Government may not have trembled at the 
prospect of an irate mob of four or five neo-Buddhist 
Kashmiri Pandits marching down La! Chowk, but the 
reference to Buddhist ahimsa combined with a thinly 
veiled threat of violence will be seen to recur again and 
again. 
At this time , Ladakhis themselves played hardly any 
role at all, be it in the expression of grievances, 
presentation of memoranda, or formulation of 
demands .13 This agenda, these strategies, these 
representations, were the work of a very small group of 
Kashmiri Pandits, Shridhar Kaul prominent among 
them, who were well aware of the grammar of 
contemporary politics in the 1930s, and who played 
consciously to a wider national and indeed international 
audience, and who understood themselves as 'elements 
in a series' of communities.14 Yet, the 1931-2 
representations to the Glancy Commission signify the 
beginning of representations of Ladakhis (in this case 
reduced to Buddhists) as a community. The language, 
justifications, and claims of representation are those of 
citizens and a community that can be compared to other 
communities in terms of development and 
backwardness, and these citizens and their community 
can make demands rather than appeals. As citizens in a 
democratizing state they have rights. 
A Separate Nation by all the Tests 
The formation of the Ladakh Buddhist Education 
Society in 1932-3, succeeded by the Young Men's 
Buddhist Association in 1938, constituted the beginning 
of Buddhist political organization in Ladakh itself. IS 
l3 Ladakhis are refen·ed to by Kaul as "dumb-diiven 
catttle" in the Memorandum. They certainly could not 
be expected to represent themselves. 
l4 Further representations to the J&K government, with 
responses which "cannot be called unsatisfactory" were 
made by the KRBMS on 18 June, 1932 and 13 March 
1934. I have been unable to locate documents pertaining 
to these events and must rely on KRBMS 1935. 
15 There is considerable confusion over the sequence of 
events in this period . Shakspo (1988) suggests that the 
Young Men's Buddhist Association was founded in 
1934. However, the Minutebook of the YMBA shows 
that their founding meeting did not take place until 
1938. In these minutes there is mention of the Buddhist 
Education Society of Ladakh and we (Kristoffer Brix 
Bertelsen and myself) are now convinced that this is 
indeed the earliest organization of this kind. An 
"Informative Questionnaire" submitted by the YMBA's 
successor, the LBA, in 1985 to the World Fellowship 
of Buddhists, gives the date of establishment of the 
YMB /> "~April 1937. Given the Minutebook, 
however , it is fair to assume that this is one year off the 
mark. In another similar summary of the history of the 
organization in the archives of the LEA, 1934 is given 
as the founding date, further adding to the confusion. 
Ganhar & Ganhar (1956: 224) take 1938 as the 
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The YMBA helped to solidify the outside perception 
that Ladakhi Buddhist representations were more or less 
sufficiently representative of Ladakhi voices as such. 
The traumatic events surrounding part ition and the 
accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir added to 
· this communalized imagining of Ladakh . On the eve of 
Nehru's first visit to the region in July 1949, this 
communal perspective is a lso clear in a representation 
made by Ka lan Tsewang R igzin on behalf of the 
Buddhists of Ladakh 16 By and large, the representation 
made the same kinds of claims and complaints as were 
raised earlier. A new element was the emphatic 
representation of Ladakh as a nation, and hence having 
the right to self-determination. It is also in this 
representation that the right to regional autonomy was 
first asserted. 
In the representation, the Ladakh Buddhist 
Association (LBA), "on behalf of the People of Ladakh" 
reiterated three proposals that were made to the Maharaja 
through the Praja Sabha in 1947. The proposals entailed 
that Ladakh should either be ruled directly by the 
Maharaja, or "amalgamated with the Hindu majority 
parts of Jammu should form a separate province" or 
alternatively, that Ladakh should be permitted to join 
with East Punjab. In the new representation, it is 
pointed out that the first two options were merely in 
deference to the Treaty of Amritsar, and that really only 
the third option, direct merger with India, would be "a 
guarantee for our future progress and development." So, 
in the submission to Nehru, the LBA asks to be merged 
directly with India (i.e. seperated from Kashmir). The 
memorandum contains the following striking passage: 
"We are a separate nation by all the tests-race, 
language, religion, culture-determining nationality. 
The only link connecting us with the other people of 
the state being the bond of common ruler. If the Indian 
National Congress could persuade itself to recognise the 
Muslims of India as a separate nation although they had 
so much in common with the other elements of the 
Indian population the Government of India should have 
no hesitation in recognising what is patent and 
incontrovertible fact in our case. ( .. . ) 
The right to self-determination claimed by us cannot 
be claimed with equal force by the people of Baltistan 
including Skardu and parts of Karg il tehsils 
predominantly populated by Muslims, as they are 
connected by ties of religion with the majority 
founding year. In Bertelsen's and my own opinion, the 
Minutebook as a contemporary document must be 
regarded as the most reliable source in this regard. For 
the most elaborate discussion of the historical evidence, 
see Bertelsen (1997). 
16 I have been unable to find an original copy of the 
Memorandum. I am relying here primarily on its 
citation in Kaul and Kau l (1992 :184) , and Madhok 
(1985). The event is also mentioned briefly by Lamb 
(1993:196) . 
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community in Jammu & Kashmir, nor by the people of 
Gilgit who came under Dogra rule through conquest 
after the annexation of Kas hmir and whom not only 
identity of religion but of race as well binds to the 
majority community of Jammu & Kashmir." (quoted in 
Madhok , 1963: 183-4) 
At thi s time Shridhar Kaul still had much influence 
on Ladakhi representations , and it is quite likely that he 
would have had a hand in formulating the memorandum . 
Its firm assertion of the ri ght to self-determination is 
striking, and repeated in different forms throughout the 
document. Ladakhis are a nation and therefore should be 
allowed to choose their own destiny . Moreoever, it is 
clear from the wording that Ladakhi is here understood 
as Buddhist, as in its description of the territories of 
Ladakh it emphasises those "predominantly inhabited by 
Boudhs ." (Madhok, 1963 : 184) 
Not surprisingly, Nehru was less than thrilled by the 
Ladakhi demand . Given the disputed nature of the status 
of Kashmir, it would have been imprudent to make any 
separate arrangement for Ladakh. According to H .N. 
Kaul, the son of Shridhar Kaul who was present at the 
meeting , Nehru was sympathetic, but would not give in 
and the Ladakhi delegation "did not, therefore, press its 
demand for a 'Union Territory Status' for Ladakh in 
national interest and on the Prime Minister's assurance 
that the ir grievances would be looked into and 
addressed." 17 
During their visit to Leh, a few weeks later, Nehru 
and Sheikh Abdullah ceded to local Ladakhi pressure (of 
a non-communal nature) and replaced the Kalon with 
Bakula Rinpoche.18 This move signified the 
incorporation of a section of Ladakh 's elite in the 
process of decision making at the State level, silencing 
the threat of a general claim for secession of Ladakh 
from Kashmir. Bakula Rinpoche and his associates 
profited politically from the reforms carried out by 
l7 Interestingly, a second delegation from Ladakh called 
upon Nehru on 20 May 1949, this time headed by 
Kushok Bakula Rinpoche, the head of the Gelugpa 
branch of Tibetan Buddhism in Ladakh. This 
delegation, according to Kaul and Kaul, "urged the 
Prime Minister that 'the territorial integrity of the 
Jammu and Kashmir State of which their country is a 
part be maintained and that the State as a whole remain 
with India." Still according to Kaul and Kaul, Bakula 
Rinpoche protested the Kashmir dominated 
administration of Ladakh and argued, as was done by the 
LBA, that with the transfer of Sovereignty the Treaty of 
Amritsar of 1846 no longer applied and hence Ladakh 
was free to choose its own destiny. Significantly, the 
memo refe1Ted to a possible reunification with Tibet if 
Ladakh were not tied directly to the Indian Union . (Kaul 
and Kaul 1992: 185). 
18 This event is sometimes referred to as the 'Coup at 
Choglamsar Bridge'. See van Beek 1996 for details. 
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Sheikh Abdullah in the fi rs t years of his reign .1 9 
However, Ladakh itself was felt to be neglected by the 
State, leading Bakula Rinpoche to deliver a scathing 
attack on the S tate Government during the budget 
session in 1953. This was the fi rs t all-out 
condemnation of the State Government by Ladakhi 
representatives. Its language was largely patriotic and 
non-communal, although the alleged discrimination by 
the State was asserted to be expressive of communalism 
of the State Government: Ladakh is not communal, but 
the State is; therefore, Ladakh needs protection from the 
State by the Centre . 
The speech includes many comparisons of the 
present regime of Abdullah with the previous regime of 
the Maharaja. In this context, the promises and claims 
of representation and democracy, of socialism and 
nationalism, made by Nehru and Abdullah during their 
visit in 1949, as well as the general rhetoric of 
nationalism are used as a basis for justifying Ladakhi 
demands. This speech, then, constitutes another 
illustration of the fundamental shift in regimes of 
justification, from subject to national citizen, that 
makes available such references to justice and equality. 
At the same time, Bakula Rinpoche is obviously 
staking a claim to Ladakh's right to self-determination, 
challenging the 'natural' integration of the region with 
India. Such a statement in this phase of the dispute over 
Kashmir was bound to receive attention from the 
Central Government in New Delhi . 
The furore caused by the speech, fueled by its 
widespread coverage in the press, led to some proposals 
by Sheikh Abdullah, including a reorganization of the 
District's administration. However, Bakula Rinpoche 
declined the offer as it fell short of meeting the demand 
for direct association with India, a demand he restated 
once again in a press statement released on 9 June 1952. 
Consequently, in spite of Bakula Rinpoche's eloquent 
speech, no action from the government on his demands 
was forthcoming. Regardless of possible sympathy with 
Ladakh's plight on the part of Nehru, the larger issue of 
Kashmir would have prohibited any major concession to 
Ladakh, in particular any rearrangement of the tenitorial 
and administrative composition of the State. 
Bakula Rinpoche's failure to secure concessions for 
Ladakh, the slow pace of development, and perceptions 
of corruption of the National Conference leaders in 
Ladakh, led to the emergence of a young, more radical, 
opposition to Bakula Rinpoche in the early 1960s. This 
group in 1969 launched an agitation along communal 
lines. While the initiative for the agitation was taken by 
the opposition, Bakula Rinpoche joined in and led 
negotiations with the State. It is said that limited 
concessions were granted by the State in return for 
19 The most important of these were a land reform 
(which had little real impact in Ladakh) and a settlement 
of debts through state mediation (which meant a great 
relief to many households) . 
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Bakula Rinpoche's disavowal of the more radical 
demands of the agitators . Consequently, the central 
demand for regional autonomy was not met. There is no 
space here to di scuss the complex and intriguing 
politics of Ladakh at the time , but the events of 1969 
were understood by younger political activists to hold 
two important lessons: communalism gets results, and 
the old elite in Ladakh cannot be trusted. Both lessons 
were applied in the context of the 1989 agitation.20 
Defensive Communalism? The 1989 
Agitation 
Although the agitation did not really start until the 
summer of 1989, already in December 1986 rumblings 
of communal dissent were beginning to re-emerge in 
Ladakh .21 In a memorandum submitted to the Prime 
Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, during his visit to Leh on 12 
December 1986, the LBA wrote: 
"It is an irony of history that the once predominant 
Buddhist population of the region is being, on the sly, 
pushed into minority status. This is being done so 
through a discreet, deliberate policy of discrimination 
and bias pursued by the successive regimes of the State 
Government. The Government, which is predominantly 
of the same community as the one that has been 
seeking protection of minority rights and identity in the 
Union Government has been the bullying agent with 
respect to the Buddhist community of Ladakh. On the 
other hand the Buddhist community, by its very nature, 
has been very secular, accommodating and tolerant."22 
The grievances listed in the memorandum are the 
usual ones, but with particular prominence given to the 
issue of conversion. It is alleged that "the Muslim 
community of the region hand in glove with the State 
Government have embarked on a conversion spree."23 
20 Again, see van Beek 1996 for detail. A shorter 
discussion can be found in van Beek and Bertelsen 
( 1997). 
21 In the intervening peiiod, a non-communal but no 
less divided political practice had dominated Ladakh. The 
most important collaborative effort was a campaign for 
Scheduled Tiibe status. A truly all-Ladakh forum led the 
movement, but failed to get more than promises from 
various Central governments. Here, too, then, the 
lesson was that a non-communal effort would get no 
results. For detail, see van Beek (1997). 
22 Memorandum submitted to Rajiv Gandhi, 12 
December 1986. Signed by President LBA, Tondup 
Sonam. 
23 The issue (or fear) of conversion is an old one, going 
back to at least the times of Shridhar Kaul and the 
KRBMc;: The issue had gained new salience also 
through a seiies of incidents involving the small 
Chiistian community in Ladakh. In 1988 an LBA 
agitation targeted them for the alleged 'kidnapping' of 
Buddhist children by a missionary group from Mizoram 
who had established a Chiistian school in Siinagar. 
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Most demands and compl a ints prese nted to the 
government in the course of the 1989 agitation were 
shared· by Muslims and Buddhists alike, and in spite of 
the initial communal fl are-up , early public statements 
were rather non-communal in tone. For example, the 
' official' beginning of the agitation can be traced to July 
18, 1989, when the LBA held a general meet ing at 
Chokhang Vihara at Leh and adopted the followin g 
resolution: 
"We the Buddhist of Ladakh , assembled here at thi s 
Historic Chokhang Vihara , Leh on the 15th day of the 
fifth month of Buddhist calendar i.e . on 18th day of July 
1989, do hereby resolve and adopt as under: -
That on 7th of July 1989 a mob consisting of some 
sunni Muslims ancL Kashmiri s attacked and tri ed to 
cause damage to the Chokhang Vihara by throwing 
explosives inside the premises of the Vihara. 
That no action has so far been taken by the State 
Government against Kashmiris and other miscreants. 
That the State Law and Order machinery having 
failed to protect lives and properties of the Buddhists 
living in Srinagar, wherefrom the Buddhist Students and 
families are being forced to flee to Ladakh or Jammu. 
Realising that Ladakh has always been treated as a 
colony and Ladakhis as a third rate c itizens of J&K 
State and accordingly, Ladakh having been neglected in 
every sphere of life Soc ially, Politically and 
economically. We firmly resolve to launch a movement 
for an alternative administrative se tup wherein the 
ethnic cultural and traditional identity of Ladakhis is 
safeguarded and that alternative is in declaiing Ladakh as 
a Union Tern tory. 
Therefore, this gatherin g , consistin g of 
representatives from all over Ladakh, do, hereby, resolve 
that we shall not rest in peace untill Ladakh is declared 
as a Union Territory ."24 
The resolution makes it clear that although the 
movement is launched by the LBA, representing the 
Buddhists of Ladakh, it does seek to defend the interests 
of all Ladakhis. Only the Sunni community is accused 
of involvement in the rioting, a door being kept open 
for the vast majority of Shia Muslims in Ladakh to join 
the agitation. The resolution was a lso immediately 
distributed to major news agencies , including PTI and 
UNI. 
The attempt to show LBA interes t in an all -Ladakh 
struggle was fu rther strengthened by the publication of 
posters , pamphlets , and public statements under the 
name of Ladakh People's Move ment fo r Union 
Territory Status (LPMUT). The prime targets in these 
publications were invaiiably Kashmiris , and these were 
alleged to have "indoctrinated" loca l Sunni Muslims . 
This, of course, was a smart strategy. F irst, it allowed 
the LBA to pose as non-communal. Yet it must also be 
24 LBA, Resolution dated 19 July, l989. 
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remembered that it is in this period that the armed 
resistance in Kashmir proper was gathering momentum. 
Hence, the seasona l traders from Kashmir, mostly 
vegetable and souvenir se llers, cou ld be accused of 
bringing "the secessionist culture of the valley into this 
strateg ica lly important region of the State."25 Reference 
was made time and again to pro-secessionist slogans 
raised in Leh bazaar and the need for the government to 
chase 'Pakistani agents' from Ladakh. All this enabled 
the LBA to position itself as patriotic and non-
communal, and strengthened its ability to gain the 
sympathy of not only Central authorities, but also wide 
sections of the media. A LPMUT spokesman said at a 
press conference in Delhi that "excluding Sunni 
Muslims with terrorist connections, all other 
communities supported their agitation. He particularly 
referred to the Kargil area dominated by the Shia 
Muslims. The Shia Muslims are also aggrieved against 
the domination of the Sunni settlers from Kashmir who 
have complete control over all the major economic 
activities." 26 
A booklet entitled Ladakh People's Movement for 
Union Territory Status: an Information Booklet, printed 
in Delhi, was widely disseminated among press and 
politicians. The parallels between this document and the 
1935 Triennial Report of the KRBMS cited earlier are 
striking. Again, we find Ladakhis, or rather the LBA, 
presenting their case using government statistics to 
prove their claim of discrimination, references are made 
to the patriotism of Ladakhis as opposed to Kashmiris, 
and so forth. But by this time the guise of the LPMUT 
can barely be maintained.27 
A very prominent feature of the LPMUT pamphlet 
is its singling out of the sunni Muslims of Leh for 
criticism, and effectively denying their Ladakhiness. 
Speaking of the post-Independence period, it says: 
"The most unfortunate part was that in all these evil 
designs the State Government used the Argons (a 
handful of Sunni Muslims of Kashmiri origin settled in 
Leh). Acting as Ladakhis they allowed themselves to be 
used as agents to the Kashmir Government in the 
execution of all their evil designs . The Government in 
25 A spokesman for the LPMUT in a press conference 
at Delhi, quoted in Hindustan Times, 8 August, 1989. 
26 Hindus tan Times, 8 August 1989. It is far beyond 
the scope of this discussion to go into the divergent 
origins of Sunni Muslims in Leh, just as it is 
impossible to address the 'truth value' of the · 
accusations levelled against them and other targets. of 
the LBA. The issue in the present analysis is not 
whether or not all these accusations, claims, and 
counterclaims are based on 'reality', but on their 
reception, deployment, and interpretation. 
27 In fact, the draft of the booklet openly states its 
provenance as LBA, Chokhang Vihara, Len. The printed 
version gives the same address, but omits mention of 
the LBA. 
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return made them into rich contractors with apparently a 
license to deal in wholesale, the future and fortune of 
Ladakhis. And for their untamed youth, pampered by the 
state and protected by the law, it has become usual to 
assault Buddhist youths and mollest (sic) women. These 
elements ( ... ) led Ladakh into a major communal 
conflicts in July last, when after a well planned assault 
on a Buddhist youth they went on to stone at the 
peacefully protesting demonstrations from the Mosque 
building."(Ladakh Peoples Movement for Union 
Ten-itory Status, 1989: 4 emphasis added) 
The pamphlet reiterates the by now familiar themes. 
The trouble in Ladakh is dubbed "unfortunate for this 
strategically sensitive region of Ladakh, but also an 
insult to the nation as a whole," thereby claiming non-
Sunni patriotism. Also, the theme of Buddhist 
traditional peacefulness is brought forward: "Today the 
people of Ladakh realize that the gentleness and 
tolerance inherent in their age-old culture are being 
mistaken for cowardice and helplessness ." And the 
"source of all the evils," the "root cause of all the feuds 
and problems in Leh" is unambiguously identified as 
"the Kashmir Government." (all quotes from Ladakh 
Peoples Movement for Union Ten-itory Status, 1989: 4) 
In the LPMUT pamphlet, the theme of patriotism is 
particularly strong. The Sunni Muslims are accused that 
"they have begun to ape their Kashmiri secessionist 
brethrens by indulging in anti-national activities." 
"Pro-Pak activists from the valley · have been 
imported into the district, at their behest to create chaos 
and subversion. Elements with established links with 
Kashmiri terrorists, disguised as businessmen, have 
been indoctrinating the Sunni youth. Pro-Pak slogan 
shouting has become a day to day affair. Attempts are 
made to transplant the secessionist culture of the valley 
into the region. To all such activities, the Government 
and the police have turned a Nelson's eye. Perhaps, that 
suits them well!" 
The Muslims of Leh, at least in terms of 
representations, had been slow to respond in an 
organized manner, it appears. Only in October 1989 a 
booklet was published seeking to show that, in fact, 
Ladakhis as a whole have suffered under Kashmir. After 
first arguing that the agitation, contrary to the claims of 
the LBA, is indeed targeting the Muslim community as 
a whole, and listing a series of attacks on Muslim 
property, the document reproduces two memoranda and a 
"supporting document" on the "origin and evolution of 
the Ladakhi Muslims." The first memorandum is from 
the "Kargil District Action Committee" headed by Agha 
Sayed Hussain Al-Mousavi: 
"When one talks of Ladakh, one is talking of about 
1,50,000 people of mixed Indo-Aryan (Dard, Kashmiri 
and other Indian origin) and Mongoloid descent living 
along the course of the high Indus and its tributaries; of 
a people who profess Islam and Budhism in equal 
numerical strength and yet speak the same language in 
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different phonetic forms, share the same cultural roots 
and life style despite the difference in faith. 
2 . That in this extensive mountainous region of 
India more than 75,000 Muslims (estimated) live as 
widely spread as do theBudhists is a fact made less 
known to the world for a variety of partisan political 
reasons. ( . .. ) Uptill now close inter-caste family 
associations, especially in Leh, had bound the people of 
the region as a homogenous group. Alas! the current 
Budhist agitation has severely damaged these cohesive 
traditions . 
3. The people outside Ladakh have been given to 
understand through press briefings by the Ladakh 
Budhist Association that the Muslims of Ladakh, 
particularly the Sunni-Muslims of Leh, are 'outsiders' 
and 'recent settlers'. In particular some extremist 
Budhist ideologues are playing up the DOGRA 
CONNECTION of the Leh Muslims in the belief that 
the DOGRA General Zorawar Singh had patronized their 
settlement in Leh during his Ladakh conquest. But 
scores of history books written by famous European 
scholars, indeed the very indigenous 'Ladakh 
Chronicles' refute this wild and recent theory. These 
documents bear testimony to the fact that while the 
earliest 'Balti' (Shia Muslim) settlement had come into 
being when King Jamyang Namgyal of Ladakh (16th 
Century) had invited 7 Muslim traders from Kashmir to 
become his 'Khar-Chog-Pa' or palace traders. And in 
consequence of the Tibeto-Mongol invasion of Ladakh 
during 1681, the Ladakhi King built the famous Leh 
Mosque and he himself had briefly converted to Islam.(. 
.. ) (Muslims of Leh and Kargil, 1989: 15-16) 
This memorandum, like the booklet as a whole, 
challenges many of the claims of the LBA, but 
especially the erasure of Muslims from Ladakhiness. 
The effect of the booklet was negligible . Few 
newspapers reported on it, and public opinion outside 
Kashmir Valley remained effectively controlled by the 
LBA and its allies. 
ST Gained, UT Lost: Towards a Hill 
Council 
On October 8, 1989 the Government made its first 
concession. Practically the entire population of Ladakh 
were declared as members of eight Scheduled Tribes. At 
the same time, the Government appeared to be reluctant 
to be seen meeting Ladakhi demands. Ladakh's Buddhist 
leadership feared that the explosive situation in Kashmir 
was keeping the government from making a gesture that 
might upset the Valley militants even more. Bakula 
Rinpoche surmised as much in a letter to the' Prime 
Minister released to the Press in late September 
1989 .28 He "warned that making Ladakhi vital interest 
28 Bakula Rinpoche at this time was serving as Member 
of the National Commission on Minorities. While he 
played no part in the conception of the agitation, he did 
constitute an important presence at the Centre. With the 
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a scapegoat on this account may not be in the overall 
national interest." 
The declaration of ST took some of the wind out of 
the sails of the agitation. For one, press reports began 
· to reflect the local Muslim perspective on the events, 
pointing towards the privileging of the Buddhists in the 
ST Iist.29 Also, the Government's insistence that 
granting UT status would prejudice the Indian claim on 
Kashmir and further fuel the insurrection in the Valley 
was widely supported in the mainstream press. 
Nevertheless, as the Hind11stan Times noted in an 
editorial, there was a genuine need for a reform of the 
region's administrative setup . 
Talks held between LBA, LMA, Centre and State on 
October 29, 1989,' were successful. The Central 
Government and J&K Government agreed to consider an 
"Autonomous District Hill Council" for the region and 
would drop all pending cases in connection with the 
agitation. In return, the LBA suspended the agitation, 
dropped the demand for a Union Territory and promised 
to work towards restoring "harmony and brotherhood 
among the Buddhists and the Muslims and other 
communities in the region."30 
The Long Wait 
The implementation of this Tripartite Agreement 
was to be delayed until 1995. In June 1990, then Home 
Minister, Mufti Mohd. Sayeed visited Ladakh and the 
LBA Vice-President, Tundup Sonam, wrote to him 
complaining about the lack of progress in 
implementing the tri-partite agreement, emphasizing 
once again Ladakh is' patriotism as "sentinels for the 
nation in four wars."31 The LBA had reason to be 
frustrated as the government, at the State and Central 
level, had not stuck to their part of the deal. However, 
the LBA, too, had failed to meet its promises, in 
particular with regard to lifting the social boycott of the 
Muslims .32 State and Centre, moreover, were hiding 
deepening of the crisis in Kashmir and the imposition 
of Governor's rule on the State, the good relations 
between the three Ladakhis at the Centre (Bakula 
Rinpoche, the Lok Sabha member and later Minister 
P.Namgyal, and Lama Lobzang) and leaders of the 
Congress (I) were increasingly important. 
29 The Sunni Arghons were denied ST status. Their 
appeal was still under consideration at the time of 
wtiting. 
30 Hindustan Times, 31 October 1989. 
31 Thupstan Sonam, Vice-President, LBA, letter to 
(J&K) Home Minister Mufti Mohd. Sayeed, 8 June 
1990. 
32 This social boycott, me len chu len chad in Ladakhi, 
was imposed by the LBA on all Buddhists in the 
summer of 1989, banning all interactions with 
Muslims. This policy was enforced through an elaborate 
system of informers, and violators were subjected to 
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behind one another 's backs, with the State proclaiming 
the declaration of a Hill Council beyond the jurisdiction 
of the State, and the Centre saying that Article 370 
prevented it from unil atera ll y taking such a step. In 
addition, though, the authorities realized that they could 
not simply ignore the Mus lims of the region. The 
question was how to get out of the deadlock. 
After the social boycott had finally been lifted at the 
end of 1992 , the LMA and LBA had come together in 
the formation of what was called the "Coordination 
Committee." Among its members were representatives 
of the Sunni, Shia, Christian and Buddhist population . 
On 8 September 1992, this Coordination Committee 
called a press conference to announce an ultimatum to 
the Government: grant Hill Council by October 15, or 
the agitation will resume. As always, care was taken to 
ensure the presence of journalists, and the ultimatum 
was indeed widely covered.33 The late Akbar Ladakhi, 
then president of the LMA, also announced that the 
LBA had expressed its support for the inclusion of the 
Sunni Argons in the ST list, further illustrating the 
now united stand of Leh's Muslim and Buddhist 
representatives. 
On 9 October 1993, the Central Government 
announced the succesful conclusion of talks with LBA 
and LMA representatives in New Delhi on the details of 
the Hill Council Act. Only a few minor issues, such as 
the name for the council, were left to be resolved. The 
Leh delegation was received in Ladakh with a victory 
parade. It soon became apparent that the celebrations 
were premature, and implementation of the agreement 
was to take another two years. 
In January 1994, P . Namgyal wrote to Home 
Minister S .B . Chavan noting that it had been "reliably" 
learnt that the draft bill no longer contained the word 
'autonomous.' This was unacceptable for the LBA, who 
were getting impatient with the delay since they had 
been assured speedy passage of the bill . In Aplil, LBA 
President Thupstan Chhewang also wrote to S .B. 
Chavan, warning him that without a Hill Council for 
Leh, Ladakhis would boycott any attempt at reviving 
the political process in the State, something the 
Congress government was desperate to achieve for 
domestic and international purposes. Angry over the 
new delays, the LBA and LMA once again jointly 
threatened to relaunch the agitation on 20 June 1994, 
and told S .B .Chavan as much during his visit to Leh on 
the 15th.34 After assurances by Rajesh Pilot, Minister 
of State for Internal Security, that the Hill Council 
issue would be tackled soon, the Coordination 
fines, and other punishments, including physical 
violence. . 
33 See e.g. Hindustan Times, 9 September 1993; 
Indian Express, 10 September 1993. 
34 Thupstan Chhewang and Akbar Ladakhi, letter to 
S .B. Chavan, 15 June, 1994. 
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Committee agreed to postpone the agitation, but 
another year passed. 
Throughout the summer and early autumn of 1994 
rumou rs continued to circulate that Hill Council was 
imminen t.35 The mood among the leadership was 
optimistic, but the final stages of the struggle were far 
from easy. Having the experience of many unfulfilled 
promises in the past , Ladakh's leadership were not in a 
mood to sit back and wait. Moreover, as Thupstan 
Chhewang said: "We were suspicious that the Centre 
would link it up with the overall Kashmir issue, and we 
feared that if there's a popular government in Kashmir 
again, the Hill Council might be shelved permanently, 
since they have never been particularly sympathetic to 
giving autonomy to Ladakh ."36 So the agitation was 
re-launched once more with a mass rally on March 6, 
1995. 
The ferocity of public sentiment must have stirred 
the government into action, because one day before a 
planned Youth March, during which "anything could 
have happened" as one leader put it, a high level 
delegation came to Leh with a mandate from the PM to 
announce that Hill Council would be establ ished within 
a month.37 The Ladakhi leadership agreed to de-escalate, 
but not to suspend the agitation, and gave an ultimatum 
of May 15 for the law to be passed . A dharna in the 
main bazaar continued a while longer until, finally, on 
May 8 the announcement was made that the bill had 
been passed. 
Conclusion 
The Indian press and the Governor representing the 
state could celebrate Ladakh's Hill Council precisely 
because Ladakh's leadership (itself a 'collective' of 
varying and contradictory composition) presented its 
claims and represented Ladakh within the bounds of the 
35 The following section draws on my "Leh's Got It!", 
Himal, July/August 1995. 
36 Thupstan Chhewang, personal communication March 
1995. 
37 'Anything' in this case referred to a carefully planned 
simultaneous bombing of most important Government 
offices. It is worth noting that throughout the 1989-
1995 peliod sticks of dynamite were set off every now 
and then to keep the authorities aware of the 
continuation of the agitation. Public rallies in Leh in 
March 1995 signified a new strategic development in 
that for the first time anti-Central government slogans 
were raise. At two rallies a red banner was carried with 
Chinese characters . According to one of the people 
behind that particular initiative, the characters simply 
stated that 'We want our Rights,' or something to that 
effect. Obviously, such a banner was intended as a 
severe provocation to the Government. One LBA leader 
referred to the use of this banner as 'childish and stupid' 
as it served no purpose and damaged the LBA's image as 
true patriots. 
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rules of the game: patriotic, democratic, and secular. 
How else could the state have celebrated its loss of 
power? 
The use of a communal strategy, interspersed with 
no~-communalized all-Ladakh representations, demands, 
c laims, and justifications, shows how a particular fie ld 
of politica lly recognizable idioms and practices was 
structuring decisions, strategies, and actions in Ladakh . 
This negotiation and contestation of the limits of the 
(politicall y) possible (and imaginable) has enabled and 
constrained Ladakh options, as well as 'outside' ones. 
Simi larly , this contested construction of a new 
politica l-administrative structure for Ladakh has itself 
become avai lable for other local movements in other 
parts of India, transforming the field of politics and 
Centre-State- local relations. Already in the summer of 
1995 the Zangskar Buddhist Association launched an 
agitation modelled clearly on the LBA strategy and 
rhetoric, c la imin g discrimination by Kas hmir and 
Muslim-dominated Kargi l district, and demanding a 
separate Hi ll Counci l for the area. 
The question remains whether this development of 
dev~lution of power to local -decision making bodies, is 
In Itself a positive development, or not. A 
straightforward answer is not possible. While the Hill 
Council offers a chance to Ladakhi political leaders to 
formulate and implement policies that they deem 
suitable or desirable for Ladakh, its conception is based 
~n a com~una li zed political frame whose logic of 
lngmentation has no logical or necessary end . The Hill 
Counci l was achieved at the cost of constructing and 
enforcin~ a conception of Ladakhiness that leaves space 
for Muslims only as an expression of the tolerance of 
~he real La~akhis: Buddhists . More importantly, the 
mtra-Buddhtst homogeneity that the communalist frame 
posits and indeed requires, is not to be found in Ladakh. 
The issues that gave rise to the demand for regional 
autonomy, namely the dislocations and perceived 
discriminations in the context of livel ihoods, remain 
unaddressed through the Hi ll Counci l per se. In fact, it 
is precisely its acceptance of both the representational 
logic of the nation-state's project and its modernizing 
(and now g lobalizing) developmentalist project that 
made possible the 'success' of the Hill Council 
agitation. 
Ladakh's leadership, both in communal and all-
Ladakh agitations, successfu lly represented themselves 
as true patriots, depicting the Kashmir government as 
communalists and the population as secessionists. To 
grant Ladakhis what they demanded, then, could be 
justif ied within the terms of the national project of 
devel~pment and the integrity of the nation's territory . 
Even m the communal period of the 1989 agitation, the 
LBA ;:,~ : itioned itself as communalist against its will, 
merely defending the Buddhists against the 
communalists from Kashmir. As a poster proclaimed: 
"May it be known to all that there is one source of all 
evils : Kashmir govt . & its agents in Leh;. one solution 
44 
to all the problems: free Ladakh from Kashmir. One 
goal, one demand of all the peop le." Autonomy for 
Ladakh could be justified quite comfortably in the terms 
of the nation's own understanding o f itself: democratic, 
. secu lar and dedicated to the deve lopment of the entire 
nation. With the rise of armed rebellion in Kas hmir and 
the increasing virulence of H indu nationalism and anti -
Mus lim sentiment in other parts of India, Ladakh ' s 
Buddhist leaders saw their chance of success in playing 
the communal card for all its worth. This also re flected 
the commonly held perception that 'the system' is 
communal, so there is no alternative . Leh now has its 
Autonomous Council, earned through decades of 
struggle and a carefu ll y crafted strateg y of 
representations of Ladakh as backward, neglected, yet 
populated (mostly) ~y patriots. The demand was , after 
all, reasonable, justifiable. Whether it will make any 
difference in terms of peoples' lives , remains to be seen. 
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